The invention of the one-time pad is generally credited to Gilbert S. Vernam and Joseph O. Mauborgne. We show that it was invented about 35 years earlier by a Sacramento banker named Frank Miller. We identify which Frank Miller it was, and speculate on what might have led him to his idea. We also discuss whether or not Mauborgne might have known of Miller's work, especially via his colleague Parker Hitt.
Introduction
One-time pads are in theory the strongest possible algorithmic cipher: if the key is used properly, they cannot be broken, even in theory. The invention of the one-time pad is generally credited to Gilbert S. Vernam of Bell Telephone Laboratories and Joseph O. Mauborgne of the U.S. Army Signal Corps [38, 72] . Vernam invented a device that would exclusive-OR keystream bits from a paper tape with the Baudot code generated by letters typed on a keyboard; he and Mauborgne realized that if the keystream tape characters were (a) perfectly random, and (b) never reused, ''the messages are rendered entirely secret, and are impossible to analyze without the key'' [72] . (To be sure, others have made similar assertions about their ciphers; Vernam and Mauborgne's claim has the advantages of being both correct and mathematically provable.) Shortly afterwards, three Germans, Werner Kunze, Rudolf Schauffler, and Erich Langlotz, adapted the principle to superencipherment of codebooks [38] .
In fact, they were anticipated by about 35 years. In 1882, a California banker named Frank Miller published Telegraphic Code to Insure Privacy and Secrecy in the Transmission of Telegrams. In it, he describes the first one-time pad system, as a superencipherment mechanism for his telegraph code [51] . 1 If used properly, it would have had the same property of absolute security.
Although in theory Miller can claim priority, reality is more complex. As will be explained below, it is quite unlikely that either he or anyone else ever used his system for real messages; in fact, it is unclear if anyone other than he and his friends and family ever knew of its existence. That said, there are some possible links to For instances, instead of confining the pre-agreements of the parties, to the deduction or addition of one number only, let one number be agreed on, for every alternate word sent in figures, and another number for every other word; or, by the same rule, let several numbers be used for addition or deduction, in any order that may be agreed on.
In addition, he suggested the use of a monoalphabetic substitution of the code letter.
Few late-19th century codebooks were much better at superencryption. The 1899 U.S. War Department code [32] , though intended primarily for administrative use, did provide for superencipherment; it was less sophisticated than Smith's. It suggested adding or subtracting a ''key number or series of key numbers,'' and gave as examples the sequence ' '25, 50, 75, 100 .'' It did, however, note that ''the use of 50 or 100, while easy to remember, should be avoided.'' Wells, Fargo did use good cryptography internally. Their codebooks contained homophones [22] ; they also used a new codebook every year [29] . In addition, they employed a double transposition as a superencipherment. While protecting commercial messages was important, a more common use was in reporting robberies and plans for pursuing robbers. Their cipher book was first used in 1874 [22] , a year after 204 S. M. Bellovin James B. Hume joined the company as chief detective [28] . We suspect (but cannot prove) that Hume instigated the deployment; the code was used primarily when dealing with robberies [22] , and half of his cases involved inside jobs [28, p. 132 ]. Hume would have wanted a way to protect his communications against rogue telegraph operators and clerks. In [36, p. 59 ], Hume and his colleague John Thacker do describe one robbery perpetrated by a telegraph operator. They do not mention any use of the cipher book. (The threat from corrupt employees goes a long way towards explaining the strong cryptography: few bandit gangs have strong SIGINT capabilities. . . .) Interestingly, on p. 83 the book talks about a robber learning that the code phrase ''Red Coat'' meant that a large payroll shipment was being sent to a particular mine; he then sent a ''ciphered message''-prearranged words [77] -to his confederates who would actually rob the train. One well-known, public codebook stood out. Slater's Telegraphic Code, to Ensure Secresy in the Transmission of Telegrams [sic] [61] talked about simple additives, but he also described a variety of more complex transforms. For example, he suggested transposing digits in code numbers, or regrouping the 5-digit code numbers into 4-digit ones. In addition, he suggested using combinations of these methods. Despite its limitations, Slater's codebook became the basis of a War Department code [19, 75] . (Curiously, Friedman's discussion of Slater's superencipherment focuses only on the use of additives, and misses the more complex transformations [19, p. 96].) None of Slater's schemes were that sophisticated. Friedman conjectures that European cryptanalysts were able to read American State Department correspondence with little trouble; this is certainly supported by Kahn.
Miller's Codebook
Miller's codebook has two independent components, a standard telegraph code intended for message compression and a superencipherment system. The telegraph code is conventional for its time: it mapped phrases into both English words and 5-digit code groups. While an 1882 codebook cannot be rated against the very sophisticated works produced in the 1920s and 1930s, it does not appear to be a particularly good compression system even when ranked against its peers. Contrast a page from Miller's book ( Figure 1 ) with one from Bloomer's 1874 codebook ( Figure 2 ), another one intended to provide confidentiality [25] ; in general, Miller maps a single plaintext word into a single codeword, though there are glaring exceptions such as the entire paragraphs that are represented by FESTIVAL or FESTIVITY, while most of Bloomer's code words represented phrases. (Bloomer also understood security better than most. Although he did not carry out the work himself, he apparently recognized the virtue of two-part codes; the book provides instructions on how to generate one and blank columns in which to write alternate code numbers.)
One of Miller's codewords, GUINEAPIG, is interesting both because it shows the limitations of the code but also for what it says about authentication over the years:
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Mother's maiden name, that old standby ''secret,'' was used that way at least as early as 1882.
Note, though, that there is a crucial security failure here: that codeword, suitably shifted, is to be followed by the secret, and the secret almost certainly has to be in plaintext: there won't be a codeword for most family names. The appearance of something that looks like a family name and is a word not in the codebook would 
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quite likely be of interest to any eavesdropper. The alternative is using codewords to spell out the name, but that will result in a large expansion of the message and hence an increase in cost. This, of course, is a failure mode of all codebooks, not just Miller's, but it does show the limitations of Miller's code for one of its intended purposes. (We note that the 1899 Preliminary War Department Telegraphic Code [31] included codewords for all officers then in the Army, to avoid precisely this problem.) Miller's codebook was not as easy to use as some. It mostly lacked subject divisions; encoders would have had to find each phrase alphabetically, and perhaps guess at precisely which word the phrase was indexed under. A clerk who is experienced with a given codebook would be less inconvenienced; this, however, creates a bias in favor of sticking with more familiar works. (Familiarity can help. Lord Nelson's famous signal ''England expects that every man will do his duty'' originally started ''England confides that . . .''. However, his signal officer immediately pointed out that ''confides'' was not in the codebook, and hence would be slower to send, whereas ''expects'' was. Nelson agreed to the change [31] .)
Given the poor compression and usability, and given that telegraph codebooks are subject to a network effect-a codebook owned by many recipients is more valuable to a sender than one owned by just a few-we suspect that it was little-used in practice. Miller did send copies to the major banks in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, St. Louis, and New Orleans; the question, though, is what would have impelled them to use it over others they were more familiar with. The problem was likely exacerbated by a lack of marketing: Miller had a full-time job as a banker, and probably couldn't spend his time persuading other banks to use his code book. As in so many other fields, marketing is extremely important when selling codebooks [38, 39] .
There is one intriguing data point that suggests that perhaps there was some use of Miller's codebook. The New York Public Library's copy lists a few additional holders of the book (Figure 3 ). That list of recipients does not appear in either the On the other hand, one of the other people on the list was C. F. Crocker, vice president of the Southern Pacific Railroad and the son of Charles Crocker, one of the builders of the transcontinental railroad. C. F. Crocker is also listed as one of nine holders of a numbered copy of a private codebook apparently used for confidentiality by some of the most powerful people in late 19th century California, including Mrs. Leland Stanford [5] . They not only did not use Miller's scheme, the cryptography in their codebook was weak even by the standards of the day, despite the fact that they clearly had access to excellent cryptography.
One unusual feature of the codebook does warrant further attention. As with virtually all codebooks, this one has blank positions for user-supplied plaintext; see, for example, the middle section of Figure 2 . Miller, by contrast, provided about 20 pages of pair-wise lists of extra words; each such page was intended for correspondence with a different individual ( Figure 4 ). This clearly shows his orientation towards point-to-point communication, rather than one-to-many or many-to-many. Any realistic use of one-time pads would indeed require point-to-point messaging. A broadcast scenario, where one party sent to multiple others, would require everyone to have a receive-only list; Miller does not describe any such thing. Given the lack of broadcast transmission media in 1882, this is not surprising.
Miller's superencipherment, by means of additives and modular arithmetic, is much more interesting. As noted earlier, additives were well-known. Miller, however, identified the essence of the one-time pad: randomness and non-repetition [emphasis in the original]:
A banker in the West should prepare a list of irregular numbers, to be called ''shift-numbers,'' such as 483, 281, 175, 892, & c.
The differences between such numbers must not be regular.
When a shift-number has been applied, or used, it must be erased from the list and not used again.
A copy of the list is to be sent to the New York Banker, who prepares a different list and sends copy thereof to the Western Banker. It seems clear that Miller understood the threat he was countering: ''Any system which allows a cipher word to be used twice with the same signification is open to detection. A little talk with a telegraph operator will convince one of this fact.'' One can, of course, question how deep his understanding was of the cryptanalytic threat, but it's hard to be clearer than that in a single sentence.
Is this a true one-time pad? Kahn defines such a system as one consisting of ''a random key used once, and only once'' [38 p. 398 ]. That Miller understood the ''once, and only once'' part is clear. But is ''the differences . . . must not be regula'' equivalent to ''random''? We submit that it is. He stressed the phrase, showing that he thought patterns were a serious, exploitable flaw. It would have been nice, though, if he had explained techniques for generating the additives, and if his samples had not all been 3-digit numbers. (According to Kahn, Vernam and his colleagues used ''characters drawn from a hat'' for keying material. ) Miller also thought about the threat model. He suggested that messages that could be sent verbally by a messenger need not be encrypted, though he also noted that as a practical matter not many people in a town would possess the codebook. Even then, however, he realized that messages needed to be authenticated, even if not encrypted. To this end, he provided a list of 100 ''test words''; a sender would take the next available shift-number modulo 100 and use that to select the appropriate test word. The receiver would verify the test word against his list of shiftnumbers; both parties, of course, would cancel that value. Miller does not seem to have considered that a telegraph operator could substitute a different message to one protected by a simple authenticator, nor does he mention that receivers must be properly trained to insist that all messages be authenticated. By contrast, a separate codebook by Slater, one that focuses on message authentication, recognizes both problems [62, pp. 4-5] :
In very many cases, however, and it is surprising in how many, the receivers of messages purporting to come from some well-known correspondent, take it for granted that every telegram which so reaches their hand must be genuine, and, without further consideration of the consequences, act upon it. . . . There still remains, however, the possibility of a fraud being committed, as it were, over the blank signature of the sender, by a dishonest servant who may be entrusted to carry to the telegraph office the message it is intended to transmit, inasmuch as he would have it in his power to substitute another message drawn up in his own interests and certified by his master's test, or to interpolate some additional words of his own. and Nothing then is easier for a dishonest cable operator than the commission of a fraud of gigantic extent.
The concept of the test word as a message authenticator appears to have been relatively new to telegraphy at the time. ''Test word'' itself appears to have been a reasonably-common 19th century phrase for actions or writing designed to prove something or someone authentic or genuine. The Freemasons are claimed have employed a Mr. Ritchie opened a communication with me a short time ago, with a view of introducing a method, which he and Mr. Chandler had contrived, for the despatch of astronomical information of interest. By this method the elements and the ephemeris, which are comprised in twelve lines of printing, were transmitted in sixteen words on a cipher telegram. We cannot go wrong in the telegram, because one test-word checks the whole message.
The full scheme was published a few years later by Chandler and Ritchie [26] . For all its cryptographic sophistication, we doubt that Miller's superencipherment system was ever used in practice: there are some serious operational deficiencies. The most important is the lack of any indicators to show where in the shift-number list the sender started; the scheme as described assumes that all messages are delivered, received, and decrypted in order. This is not a realistic assumption; a high-priority telegram composed late in the day would arrive before a ''night letter'' composed earlier. Real-world one-time pads generally use something like a page number=additive number pair to show where to start decrypting. There is one nod in that direction-the codeword PECCADILLO means ''For this and all other dispatches from us 2 The first Wells, Fargo codebook dates to 1874; the Library of Congress has not been able to locate their copy, nor have we found another source. The Wells Fargo Historical Services office has codebooks dating only to 1877. Information from [22] suggests that in 1883 the test words were as much indicators to denote the length of the message. Still, if they were changed frequently enough they would serve as authenticators.
we beg that you will use 'shift-numbers' from our list commencing next below Number-''-but that is rather clumsier than using indicators routinely.
There are also two codewords to deal with a shortage known to one side but not the other. PEBBLES means ''send more shift numbers''; PECANA means ''No shift numbers here available, so use the 'plain cipher' [the codebook without superencryption] or English.'' However, the sender's list has to be in synchrony with the receiver's; one side can't run out without the other knowing it [73] . Possibly, the intent was to deal with exception cases, such as loss or compromise of an additive list; if so, one would expect special codegroups to indicate the problem, and most likely coupled with the ''send more'' message.
Who Was Frank Miller?
It is difficult, at this remove in time, to be certain just which Frank Miller developed the one-time pad system. (To avoid confusion, in this section we will refer to the author of [51] as the ''compiler,'' and reserve the proper name ''Frank Miller'' for a particular historical figure. ) That said, there are enough clues that-aided by happenstance-we have come to a strong, albeit not certain, conclusion. We believe that the compiler is the [56] , from an electronic copy held by the University of Michigan Digital Library.) 3 [60] calls Miller a ''founding trustee''. Arguably, this is correct, given the convoluted governance history of the university [18]; however, [6, p. 9] clearly identifies his predecessor in a given Board seat.
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The codebook itself offers a few concrete details. The copyright page identifies the compiler as living in Sacramento. In the preface, he describes himself as having ''sixteen years' banking experience''. Sixteen years before the publication date was 1866, immediately after the U.S. Civil War ended; this would be a logical time for a young man leaving the army to have started a permanent job. It also seems likely that the compiler had at least some acquaintance with cryptanalysis.
The population of Sacramento was not large at the time, probably around 35,000-36,000 given the 1880 and 1890 census figures. 4 There were 14,526 males over 21 years old in 1880, reducing the set still further. (That figure was not collected in 1890.)
We know that there were not many banks in Sacramento then [21, 76] . Conceivably, of course, someone could have worked at other banks before moving to Sacramento; that said, a Frank Miller who did start at a Sacramento bank in 1866 would very likely be the person we are looking for. Assorted Internet searches turned up a published genealogical history [60] that describes a person with precisely those characteristics; except as otherwise indicated, the biographical information in the remainder of this chapter is taken from it. (The other valuable source was a brief 1896 biography of Miller in Overland Monthly [56] . To modern eyes, that one starts strangely, addressing him as ''Comrade Frank Miller'' and describing him as coming from ''good old revolutionary stock'', phrases we would regard as more apt for a descendant of a veteran of Mao's Long March than for a California banker.) Additionally, census record searches via http://www.familysearch.org show just two Frank Millers in Sacramento in 1880; one worked at the D.O. Mills bank and the other was a ''laboror'' [sic]. 5 The list of codebook holders (Figure 3 [60] or 1857 [56] (though [1] , an obituary for his father from the Sacramento Record-Union, says 1850). He attended Phillips Academy in Exeter, New Hampshire, enrolled at Yale in 1861, and enlisted in the Second Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry regiment in 1862. He fought at Antietam and was wounded at the Second Battle of Bull Run.
In 1863, Miller, by then a sergeant, was transferred to clerical duties in the Inspector General's office. The following year he was ''promoted to a civil clerkship'' in New York [56] working for Colonel Henry Steel Olcott, a prominent investigator of fraud and corruption during the Civil War [52, 70] . 6 Olcott offered to assist in investigating Lincoln's assassination; Secretary of War Stanton replied, ''come and bring your force of detectives'' [30, 52] . He was apparently effective, being described as ''the most 4 Data retrieved from the University of Virginia Library Historical Census Browser, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/ 5 The census record for the banker Frank Mills at https://www.familysearch.org/ s/recordDetails/show?uri=http://pilot.familysearch.org/records/trk:/fsrs/rr_206956290/ p_334654861&hash=HloWXpZgU9zB10k5M56iYku8TUc%253D shows a birth year of 1850, which is inconsistent with other sources and difficult to reconcile with Civil War service. The other data listed agree so well with [60] that we suspect an error in the record or in its digitization. 6 Olcott himself had a very colorful career. After the war, he became a lawyer. He grew interested in spiritualism, converted to Buddhism, and was one of the founders of the American Theosophical Society. Most of the published information on him concentrates on his religious career. conscientious member of the investigative team'' [41] . Miller apparently came with that ''force of detectives'', though we do not know what his role was. We suspect that it was during the 1863-1865 period, investigating various crimes and peculations, that Miller became acquainted with encryption and perhaps cryptanalysis.
Miller's father was the founding vice president of the D.O. Mills bank; Frank Miller was the cashier. (Context, such as Miller's stock grant [60] , and reading of other sources from the time suggests that ''cashier'' was an executive position, rather than, say, a bank teller.) On his father's death in 1878 he became vice president; he became president in 1893 when Edgar Mills, the founding president, died. Miller retired as president in 1904 [7] . After that, he no longer resided full-time in Sacramento; he and his wife traveled a great deal and lived in a number of different places before settling down in Berkeley in 1910 or 1911. He and his wife moved to the Pendleton Hotel in San Francisco in 1905 [43] after spending a year or so in Europe; they moved to Sausalito for the summer of 1906 [44] and ended up staying there [46] , probably because of the 1906 earthquake and fire. Fortuitously, that move took place a few days before the quake [45] . He did plan to return frequently to San Francisco; he was one of the guests of honor at a banquet scheduled for 20 April 1906 [9] , and he and his wife had purchased opera tickets for the forthcoming season [12] . They also returned to Sacramento often [8, 10, 11, 45] , as well as traveling to Oregon where Miller had significant business interests [7] .
We know little of Miller as a person. Examination of his correspondence to and from the president and trustees of Stanford University [4, 13] suggests that he was a forthright, blunt, almost brusque individual; he concluded more than one letter with ''do not bother to answer this'' or similar words. Another letter, evaluating a proposed personnel policy, concluded with ''He is not so competent, nor is any other man.'' He resigned as a trustee in 1916-a post that, from his resignation letter, he valued highly-because of ill health [13] and failing eyesight [60] . His relations with one of his sons was strained, apparently over financial issues but with the sense that he thought this son was rather irresponsible.
At some point, the compiler acquired an interest in communications. The codebook's preface quotes a ''Colonel Myers'' [sic] on the value of cryptography; this is Albert J. Myer, the father of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, and the quote is slightly paraphrased from from Myer's classic work ''A Manual of Signals'' [54] . (Myer is also considered the father of the Weather Bureau; as a result, he was sometimes known as ''Old Probabilities'' [75] .) It is worth noting that the passage does not appear in the 1864 version of the Manual [53] , the only one Miller might have seen while in the service; it does appear in the 1866 and later editions. It is unclear whether an ordinary soldier would have known of or remembered Myer, or been familiar with that book; someone who had worked in intelligence or cryptanalysis almost certainly would. Myer was reasonably prominent after the war, though; it is conceivable that the 1879 edition [55] -the first to be issued by the Government Printing Office-or Myer's death in 1880 stimulated the creation of the codebook.
We suspect that the compiler did not have hands-on experience as a code or communications clerk or as a cryptanalyst; such a person would have been more familiar with indicators, message serial numbers, telegrams being sent out of order, etc. On the other hand, the preface does discuss common transmission errors on telegraph systems (e.g., confusing some Morse symbols with others). It was comparatively unusual to see such discussions in codebooks of that era; this may indicate more than usual familiarity with telegraphy.
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As a prominent businessman, Miller did associate with other local businessman. One possibly-significant connection was to Felix Tracy, the Wells, Fargo agent in Sacramento [58] . We know that he knew Miller [2] ; in fact, he was at Miller's son's wedding [3] a few years after the codebook came out. If Tracy had mentioned the Wells, Fargo cipher book, and especially if he had explained the cumbersome encoding process, perhaps Miller might have been inclined to think of an apparently-simpler solution. Unfortunately, we have been unable to find any evidence to support this, save for a few newspaper articles showing that Tracy and Miller knew each other. The best available profile of Tracy [78] makes no mention of code books.
It is fortunate indeed for our research that Frank Miller was a prominent person. He was sufficiently important that he was one of the original trustees of Stanford University and left a considerable paper trail, including coverage on the Society pages of the San Francisco Chronicle. Even more important, his descendants preserved information about him and someone compiled it all [60] .
Linkages
The compiler of this codebook-we are certain that it was this Miller-clearly developed the one-time pad; his influence on history, however, is much less clear. It is much like the old philosophical conundrum of a tree falling in a forest with no one around: does it make a sound? Did Vernam or Mauborgne ever learn of Miller's work? Again, there are no firm answers; the best we can do is to speculate.
We can almost certainly rule out contact with Vernam [40] . Vernam was an electrical engineer whose specialty was the encryption hardware; he was not a cryptologist. Kahn concluded long ago that Mauborgne, not Vernam, had the essential cryptologic insight on non-reuse of keys; see Kahn's endnote discussion about the development of the non-repeating key for a Vernam machine in [38] .
There was not much more chance of direct contact between Miller and Mauborgne. Mauborgne was not stationed in San Francisco until 1932 [65] , well after the period of interest. He did pass through the port of San Francisco en route to the Philippines [15] , but any encounter with Miller would have been pure coincidence. There does, though, appear to have been one possible opportunity. Mauborgne's ship was scheduled to sail on November 5, 1913 ; there was a large ball to open the Portola Festival on October 23, and officers were invited [16] . However, we have not found any evidence that either he or Miller attended it. Neither is in the attendee list given in [14] , though that article lists people who were ''among the invited guests'' [emphasis added]. Furthermore, a quick scan of the Society columns of the San Francisco Chronicle shows very few mentions of Miller after 1910.
A more intriguing possibility is contact between Miller and Parker Hitt. Hitt, an expert cryptologist and the author of Manual for the Solution of Military Ciphers [34] , was Mauborgne's student and colleague. In 1914, he took a major step towards development of the one-time pad when he wrote ''No message is safe in the Larrabee cipher unless the key phrase is comparable in length with the message itself'' [38] ; his first observations along that line were presented a few years earlier at an Army Signal School Technical Conference [35] . 7 The text 7 Kahn had speculated that Hitt formulated this precept before 1914. Research by Craig Bauer, Drew Wicke, and John W. Dawson, Jr., has confirmed this. However, the paper they found is by Hitt and Lieutenant Karl Truesdell, and does not acknowledge Mauborgne. Truesdell compiled the first set of multilingual frequency for the U.S. Army [38] . makes it clear that he was worried about Kasiski examinations in what was essentially a Vigenére cipher, rather than any more general principle. The text also notes that multiple encryption with keys of different lengths is not that strong, either; this was later relearned by Vernam and Mauborgne. It is quite certain that if Hitt knew of Miller's system, he would have shared the information with Mauborgne when they were together at the Army Signal School in Fort Leavenworth.
Crucially, it is virtually certain that Miller and Hitt did meet, and under circumstances where the codebook could very easily have come up in conversation. Hitt was stationed at the Presidio in San Francisco June 1906-March 1907 [66] ; according to his diary, he did attend a number of social functions during that time [33] , though we do not know for certain if Miller was at any of them. More importantly, Hitt and Miller both attended ''the most brilliant military ball which San Franciscans remember to have seen in many years'' [47] . This party was hosted by ''the bachelor officers of the Twenty-Second Infantry,'' including Hitt. The hosts ''received the guests at the entrance to the hall, then escorting them to the ladies of the receiving party.'' Since this was a party by ''bachelor officers,'' and since Miller and his wife were accompanied by their daughter Edith, it is hard to imagine that Hitt and Miller did not talk. Edith would have been regarded as highly eligible; she was 25, single, an ''unusually attractive, charming girl'' [48] (also see her picture at [60, p. 445]), a former Stanford student, and from a prominent, well-to-do family. She may herself have been looking; marriages to officers of that regiment were regarded as quite desirable [48] . Indeed, six months later she married another officer listed as a host, Lieutenant Matthew H. Thomlinson [46] .
Given this, we are convinced that Miller and Hitt at least exchanged greetings and probably chatted more. Furthermore, given that the ball was partly to celebrate the first anniversary of the regiment's return from the Philippines, we assume that Miller asked Hitt about his activities there. As it turns out, among other activities Hitt had set up communications lines and served as the regiment's intelligence officer. He was also very interested in telecommunications [67] , among very many other things. (Hitt had extremely wide-ranging interests. At the same conference where he talked about key lengths, he also talked about testing dry cells. Another paper of his, never published, concerned the use of electricity for the Signal Corps [68] .) Had this come up at all in conversation, it strikes us as highly probable that Miller-a man who was interested in the subject, and knew of and quoted Myer's book-would have recounted his own efforts in the field. But Miller was brusque; it is also easy to imagine that his manner in speaking could have put off Hitt, who could easily have treated this as an amateur giving advice on telecommunications to someone who had done it in the real world. Speculation can only take us so far. Simply mentioning authorship of a codebook, or even a codebook and superencipherment system, is very different from trying to explain shift-numbers at a party. Based on the evidence available thus far, we cannot quite conclude that Hitt knew enough about Miller's system to have been influenced by it. Conversely, of course, we also cannot conclude that he was ignorant of it. Perhaps one aspect-keying material as long as the plaintext-stayed with him and influenced his comments about the Larrabee system.
Our overall verdict is ''not proven.'' For effective transmission to have happened, Miller would have had to tell Hitt of his idea in some detail. Hitt would have had to retain enough memory of it to use in in formulating his maxim about key [38] .) Drawing any further conclusions will be difficult unless more documentation is unearthed. Hitt's papers have been scrutinized by many historians and were rechecked for us by Betsy Rohaly Smoot; they are unlikely to hold any surprises, unless there are cryptic references to Miller that would have been meaningless without the context supplied here (and Smoot hasn't found any). The link to Felix Tracy may be a promising path to explore, though it is difficult to imagine what form such evidence might take. Miller's papers and diary may hold clues; they existed at least as late as 1987 [60] , but we have been unable to locate them. (Neither of the two obvious repositories, Stanford University and the California State Library, has them.) We leave these matters to other historians who are more diligent, or who have access to resources that we do not.
Conclusions
It is clear that Miller invented the one-time pad: res ipsa loquitur. His work was remarkable, not just because he invented a secure encryption scheme 35 years before it was reinvented, but also because it came out of the blue. Vernam and Mauborgne were working in the field; Vernam was trying to build a secure communications system and Mauborgne was the head of research and engineering for the U.S. Army Signal Corps. They were the sort of people one would expect to invent such a thing. Miller, on the other hand, was a banker, whose only first-hand experience with cryptology (if any) was likely 16 years earlier. Still, he was not the first amateur to make a significant contribution to the field. Indeed, Kahn has a chapter entitled ''The Contribution of the Dilettantes''. The most remarkable tale in that chapter is that of Thomas Jefferson, who invented a wheel cipher in the 1790s, an invention that was promptly forgotten and not rediscovered in his papers until 1922. Ironically enough, Jefferson's cipher was reinvented a few years before that by French cryptologist É tienne Bazeries; it was brought to the U.S. and refined by none other than Parker Hitt and Joseph Mauborgne. 8 One can also speculate on the risks of tying a bad system-the conventional codebook Miller authored-to a good one. Had Miller published-and marketed-his superencipherment independently from his codebook, it might have succeeded. Robert Slater's codebook [61] , intended only for confidentiality, was even worse than Miller's for compression (though it had 25,000 words, compared with Miller's 12,800); despite that, the work went through nine editions, the last published in 1938 [63] , and was even the basis for a U.S. government codebook [19, 75] . The difference was likely marketing-Slater was secretary of the French Atlantic Telegraph Company-but regardless, Slater's work survived and was influential; Miller's work has been forgotten.
It is tempting to speculate on how history may have been different had people paid attention. Almost certainly, one-time pads would never have been employed 8 One should not draw the conclusion that Hitt was a habitual plagiarist who stole from both Miller and Bazeries. Kahn quotes Hitt's memo as explicitly crediting Bazeries for the wheel cipher. Hitt was in fact punctilious about assigning proper credit [66] . for most military communications; the operational difficulties, then as now, would have been prohibitive. But what of high-level diplomatic correspondence? Kahn tells many tales of cryptanalysis of such messages between 1882 and 1918; might things have been different? Might the German Foreign Ministry been able to protect Zimmermann's fateful telegram with a one-time pad if they had known of Miller's work? And if so, would the U.S. have entered World War I when it did? It is worth noting that Germany did adopt a one-time pad superencipherment for its diplomatic codes right after World War I [38] . 9 Finally, it takes nothing away from Vernam or Mauborgne's own creativity to acknowledge that Miller had the same idea. If nothing else, their system-an online, automated mechanism that operated on the 0 s and 1 s of Baudot code-was far more usable and was the precursor to today's computerized stream ciphers.
